law

Single European Sky – can the vested interests be overcome

Article published on February 2014 in Legal Eye and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

Following the failure of the first Single European Sky initiative (called SES I, launched in 2004), the European Commission launched a second package of legislation in 2009 called SES II, which was designed to remove the fragmentation caused by the inefficient use of 27 national airspaces, through the introduction of what are called "Functional Airspace Blocks" or FABs. These nine designated FABs were supposed to be operational by the end of 2012, but EU Member States have delayed dismantling their domestic air traffic monopolies in order to form these regional blocks, for political reasons. In early 2012, the EU Transport Commissioner Siim Kallas announced further new legislation proposals which he called "SES II plus", with the objective of accelerating implementation of the SES II reforms, and enabling enforcement measures to be taken against non-compliant EU Member States. Then, in June 2013 the European Commission laid out its proposals to update the four regulations creating the Single European Sky. The key proposals are as follows:

The Commission's June 2013 updated proposals

Better safety and oversight

The Commission is proposing full organisational and budgetary separation of national supervising authorities from the air traffic control organisations they oversee, in order to improve oversight and safety. Many supervisory authorities are currently under-resourced and dependent on the support of the entities they are supposed to oversee. Airlines will also have a new role in signing off air traffic control organisations' investment plans to ensure they are better focused in meeting customer needs.

Better air traffic management performance

The reform of Europe's air traffic management is driven by four key performance targets: safety, cost-efficiency, capacity and environment. Under the current system EU Member States can set their own performance targets and decide which corrective measures to apply if targets are not met. The Commission is proposing to strengthen the performance scheme by making the target-setting more independent, transparent and enforceable, by strengthening their own role in setting more ambitious targets and increasing the independence of the Performance Review Body as the key technical advisor, so as to enable sanctions to be applied when the performance targets are not met by Member States.

New business opportunities in support services

The Commission is proposing to open up business opportunities for more companies to provide support services to air traffic control organisations. Support services such as meteorology, aeronautical information, communication, navigation and surveillance services will have to be separated out under the new draft regulations, so they can be put out to competitive tender in an open and transparent way in accordance with normal EU procurement rules. Support services are the biggest driver of cost in air traffic management and these costs could be cut by 20% if they are put out to competitive tender.

Enabling industry partnerships

None of the nine Functional Airspace Blocks or FABs are fully operational, in spite of a deadline set in December 2012 for EU Member States to establish them. The Commission is currently examining infringement cases against all Member States, particularly where no progress towards reform is made in the next few months. However the Commission has recognised that the FABs are rather inflexible political constructs, so is proposing that service providers co-operate more flexibly by allowing the creation of "industry partnerships" – which will allow service providers to participate in more than one FAB.

Strengthening the role of the Network Manager

The proposed regulations seek to strengthen the role of the Network Manager, Eurocontrol, to ensure that co-ordination of air traffic flows between the national service provider, and tasks such as route design and co-ordination of radio frequencies are carried out more centrally. The proposals could also see the provision of a wider range of services by the Network Manager to air traffic control organisations, such as information networks, monitoring of technical systems, and airspace design. These services could be provided centrally or outsourced by the Network Manager.

The Commission's proposals to update the four regulations creating the Single European Sky will have to be approved by Member States and Parliament before they are passed into law, which could prove to be yet another stumbling block for the progress of these measures.

There has been considerable resistance to some of the measures proposed in the "SES II plus" package from some EU Member States, particularly France and Germany. The European Transport Workers Federation, which represents most of the air traffic controllers and air traffic management workers in Europe has rejected the "SES II plus" package, on the basis that it will only have negative effects on jobs and working conditions for their union members. French air traffic controllers went on strike at the beginning of October in protest at the proposed "SES II plus" package because they are concerned about losing their jobs if the Commission's proposals to deregulate the profession are passed into law. The Air Traffic Controllers European Unions' Co-ordination (ATCEUC) also called for a strike at the beginning of October across 26 European countries – the industrial action was only called off when the European Commission assured them they would take ATCEUC's views into consideration.

Although perhaps not the most exciting package of legislation being debated in Europe at the moment, it is nonetheless critically important for the industry. There are some nine million flights across European airspace annually, and EuroControl is forecasting a further 50% increase in flights over the next 10-20 years. The Commission has estimated that the EU's air traffic management inefficiencies caused by national airspace fragmentation add 42km to the average flight, waste fuel, increase emissions, and cost €4.6 billion per annum. The intransigence of EU Member States, which is rooted in the vested interests of labour protection, the revenue streams generated by national air traffic management bodies, and misplaced concerns over the protection of sovereignty over national airspace, is delaying critical progress in reforming what is a seriously inefficient system. The US controls a similar amount of airspace as Europe, with more traffic, at half the cost, and if and when the "SES II plus" measures are implemented, the European Commission says that safety will be improved by a factor of ten, airspace capacity will be tripled, the cost of air traffic management will be halved, and the impact on the environment of carbon emissions reduced by 10%.

IATA's Director General, Tony Tyler, said earlier this year that progress in the implementation of the "SES II plus" package of measures is critical to the competitiveness of the European aviation industry:

"The European Commission shares the industry's frustration with the failure of European states to progress the SES. Every year that SES languishes in limbo is a €5 billion knock to European competitiveness and costs the environment 8.1 million tonnes of wasted carbon emissions."

Author: Paul Phillips (Partner, Head of aviation litigation and regulation with Stephenson Harwood) / Publisher: SCMO

Ship-to-ship transfer – whether reasonable to refuse permission

Article published on July 2014 in Stephenson Harwood Shipping Bulletin and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

The parties entered into a voyage charter of the Falkonera, a VLCC, on BPVOY4 with amendments, which included:

"Charterers shall have the option of transferring the whole or part of the cargo … to or from any other vessel including, but not limited to, an ocean-going vessel, barge and/or lighter …

if charterers require a ship-to-ship transfer operation or lightening by lightering barges to be performed then all tankers and/or lightering barges to be used in the transhipment shall be subject to prior approval of owners, which not to be unreasonably withheld, and all relevant certificates must be valid"

The Falkonera loaded oil in Yemen. Charterers asked owners to approve STS transfers into three vessels (Kythira, Front Queen and Front Ace). Kythira was smaller than Falkonera, while Front Queen and Front Ace were both VLCCs, the same size as Falkonera. Owners approved transfer to Kythira, but refused to allow transfer from the Falkonera into either the Front Queen or the Front Ace, in spite of a number of efforts to deal with owners' safety concerns. Charterers then proposed an alternative vessel, True, and eventually permission for discharge into True was given, and the cargo was transferred into True and Kythira.

Charterers claimed that implementing the plan of bringing in the True involved significant delay and increased cost which were for owners' account. They argued that owners had unreasonably refused permission for the proposed STS transfers, as their opposition was based on aversion to any VLCC-VLCC transfer, rather than to the characteristics of a particular vessel.

Charterers' claim succeeded, and owners appealed:

Held:
 
The appeal was dismissed.
 
1     It was for charterers to prove that owners had acted unreasonably. In order to entitle owners to withold approval it was not necessary that their conduct was correct or their conclusions right. They would only be in breach if no reasonable shipowner could have regarded their concerns as sufficient reason to decline approval.

2     The right to transfer was "to … any other vessel", including a VLCC. The fact that transfer VLCC to VLCC could be regarded as non-standard was not of itself reasonable ground for refusal. Owners were taken to have agreed in the contract to have accepted such risks as were inevitably attendant on a VLCC-VLCC transfer. It was necessary for there to be some other basis on which the withholding of approval could be said to be unreasonable.

3     The issue was not whether owners were satisfied with the planning of the STS transfer, but whether there was some characteristic of the receiving vessel which meant that the STS would be unsafe.

4     The judge's conclusion was one of fact, reached after extensive consideration of expert evidence. He had applied the correct legal test.

(Falkonera Shipping v Arcadia Energy [ 2014 ] EWCA Civ 713)

Authors: Michael Bundock, Senior Associate and professional support lawyer with Stephenson Harwood & Joanne Champkins, Associate specialising in marine insurance with Stephenson Harwood / Publisher: SCMO

LNG time charter on Shelltime 4 – meaning of injurious cargo

Article published on July 2014 in Stephenson Harwood Shipping Bulletin and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

In an LNG time charter based on Shelltime 4, a clause provided: "No acids, explosives or cargoes injurious to the vessel shall be shipped".

G (the charterers) loaded a cargo of LNG onto the vessel in the United States. M (the owners) alleged that the cargo was injurious to the vessel because it contained debris, in particular metal particles, which had contaminated the vessel's cargo pumps and tanks, causing abrasion, rust and risk of electrical short and pump failure, and that consequently major repairs to the vessel were required after it was dry-docked.

G disputed that the cargo was injurious. There was no previous authority on the meaning of "injurious" cargoes.

Held:

M's claim failed.

1     In order to be "injurious", cargo had to either cause physical damage to the vessel or have a tendency or propensity to cause damage.

2     The evidence about the loading of the cargo justified the inference that some small particles had passed through the mesh filters in the manifolds before they clogged on two occasions, and that some of the particles, maybe as many as one-third of them, were metallic. However, no more could be inferred: the evidence did not establish that larger particles were loaded in any significant number, and it provided no basis for inferring how much particulate debris was loaded. The evidence did not support M's reasoning that the bulk of the debris found in the tanks was from the loading, nor did it establish M's case that debris from the loading created a risk of damage to the vessel. Some of the debris found in the vessel's tanks after it was dry-docked was debris from the loading, but M had not proved that much of it was shipped by G at the loading terminal. It was more likely that the greater part of it was from elsewhere.

3     On the facts, owners had failed to prove that the charterers had shipped a cargo which was injurious to the vessel, or that metallic particles in the cargo had created potential dangers to the vessel.

(American Overseas Marine v Golar Commodities [ 2014 ] EWHC 1347 (COMM))

Authors: Michael Bundock, Senior Associate and professional support lawyer with Stephenson Harwood & Joanne Champkins, Associate specialising in marine insurance with Stephenson Harwood / Publisher: SCMO

Trip time charter – whether vessel off-hire during detention

Article published on July 2014 in Stephenson Harwood Shipping Bulletin and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

A vessel was chartered by NYK to Cargill for a time charter trip. Cargill sub-chartered to Sigma. The cargo was a shipment sold by Transclear to IBG. (Transclear were a sub-charterer, but it was not clear whether this was from Sigma or from an intermediate charterer.)

A dispute concerning unpaid demurrage arose between Transclear and IBG and Transclear had the vessel arrested. Cargill withheld hire for the period of the arrest, relying on clause 49 of the charterparty:

"Should the vessel be captured or seizured [sic] or detained or arrested by any authority or by any legal process during the currency of this Charter Party, the payment of hire shall be suspended until the time of her release, unless such capture or seizure or detention or arrest is occasioned by any personal act or omission or default of the Charterers or their agents."

The arbitral tribunal held that Cargill were entitled to put the vessel off hire. On appeal Field J held that Cargill were not so entitled. Cargill appealed.

 Held:

The appeal was dismissed. Cargill were not entitled to put the vessel off hire, as the arrest had been "occasioned by any personal act or omission or default of the Charterers or their agents".

1     The word "agents" in clause 49 was not limited to agents strictly so called. Delegates of Cargill could be its agents for the purposes of the clause, irrespective of the precise contractual relationship existing between the delegate and the party above him in the contractual chain. The word “agents” was accordingly capable of extending to sub-charterers, sub-sub-charterers and receivers.

2     The acts or omissions or defaults in question were not restricted to those occurring "in the course of the performance by the delegate of the delegated task".

3     The general scheme of clause 49 was that the vessel would be off-hire where the relevant matters were either on NYK's side of the line or were the acts or omissions of third parties (eg government authorities) unconnected to either NYK or Cargill.

4     However, the dispute between Transclear and IBG clearly fell on Cargill's side of the line. The dispute arose out of Cargill's trading arrangements. The result was that hire continued to run over the relevant period (subject to questions of causation). The acts or omissions of both Transclear and IBG led to that result.

(The Global Santosh [ 2014 ] 2 Lloyd's Rep 103)

Authors: Michael Bundock, Senior Associate and professional support lawyer with Stephenson Harwood & Joanne Champkins, Associate specialising in marine insurance with Stephenson Harwood / Publisher: SCMO

Bill of lading – clause paramount – agreement for limitation figure

Article published on July 2014 in Stephenson Harwood Shipping Bulletin and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

Cargo was shipped under a bill of lading for carriage from Belgium to the Yemen. It included the following clause:

"Paramount Clause

The Hague Rules contained in the International Convention for the Unification of certain rules relating to Bills of Lading, dated Brussels 25 August 1924 as enacted in the country of shipment shall apply to this contract. When no such enactment is in force in the country of shipment, the corresponding legislation of the country of destination shall apply, but in respect of shipments to which no such enactments are compulsorily applicable, the terms of the said Convention shall apply.”

A dispute arose, and it was subsequently agreed that the claim would be subject to English law and jurisdiction. The principal point at issue was the figure of package limitation which was applicable. The Hague-Visby Rules had mandatory application by virtue of Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971. However, the claimants argued that by contractually adopting (by a clause paramount) the Hague Rules the parties had contracted out of the Hague-Visby package limitation figure in favour of the claimants.

Held:

The Hague-Visby Rules limitation figure applied.

1     The Hague-Visby Rules have been enacted in Belgium. The judge held that he was bound by The Happy Ranger to hold that the Hague-Visby Rules were not to be regarded as the "Hague Rules … as enacted in the country of shipment", as there were important differences between the two codes.

2     The Yemen has not enacted either the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules, so the opening words of the second sentence of the clause paramount did not apply. Accordingly, the last phrase of the second sentence applied, and the clause paramount took effect as a contractual agreement that the Hague Rules would apply.

3     However, the Hague-Visby Rules had mandatory application. Art IV(5)(g) of those Rules permits agreements which increase the carrier's liability above that laid down by the Rules. The judge rejected the view expressed in Voyage Charters that Art IV(5)(g) only permits the use of a formula if there are no circumstances in which it could produce a figure lower than that specified by Art IV(5)(a) of the Rules. The judge held that an Art IV(5)(a) agreement would only be invalid to the extent that in any particular case it in fact produced a limit lower than that permitted by the Rules.

4     However, the judge did not accept that the parties had made any such agreement in this case. Had the parties thought about the clause paramount, they would have understood that the Hague Rules would not apply at all because Belgium is a Hague-Visby Rules State. They would have viewed the clause paramount as surplusage, which could be ignored.

5     If (contrary to the judge's conclusion) the Hague Rules limit applied, then the limit was £100 per package or unit gold value. This refers to the gold value of £100 sterling, not its nominal or paper value, so that the applicable limitation figure is the value of 732.238 grams of fine gold (The Rosa S). The judge held that the time at which this gold value is to be converted into national currency is the date of delivery (or, in the case of loss, the date when the goods ought to have been delivered), and not the date of judgment.

(Yemgas FZCO v Superior Pescadores [ 2014 ] EWHC 971 (Comm))

Authors: Michael Bundock, Senior Associate and professional support lawyer with Stephenson Harwood & Joanne Champkins, Associate specialising in marine insurance with Stephenson Harwood / Publisher: SCMO

Foreign insolvency – whether termination of contract of affreightment prevented

Article published on July 2014 in Stephenson Harwood Shipping Bulletin and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

F, a party to a contract of affreightment which was expressly subject to English law, had an express right to terminate the contract on the insolvency of the other party, P (a Korean company). P entered into an insolvency process in Korea, and that process was recognised by an order of the English Court as a "foreign main proceeding under the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 ("the CBIR").

F terminated the contract of affreightment under its express contractual right. The administrator of P applied to the English Court for an order that F should not exercise its right to terminate.

Held:

The application was rejected by Morgan J.

1     The Court's power under CBIR to order a stay of "the commencement or continuation of individual actions or individual proceedings" did not apply. The service of a notice terminating the contract was not the commencement or continuation of an individual action or individual proceeding.

2     

The Court had power under CBIR to grant "any appropriate relief". However:
2.1     that did not give the Court power to order that F should not terminate the contract. The Court's power was limited to relief which would be available to the court when dealing with a domestic insolvency.

2.2     Even if the court had such a power, the judge would not have exercised it. It was appropriate for the Companies Court to apply English law and to give effect to the parties' choice of English law.

(Fibria v Pan Ocean [ 2014 ] EWHC 2124 (Ch))

Authors: Michael Bundock, Senior Associate and professional support lawyer with Stephenson Harwood & Joanne Champkins, Associate specialising in marine insurance with Stephenson Harwood / Publisher: SCMO

 

Sanctions against National Iranian Tanker Company ruled unlawful

Article published on July, 8 2014 in Legal Eye and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

Stephenson Harwood welcomes the ruling of the General Court of the European Union that EU sanctions against National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) are unlawful.

NITC has been subject to sanctions since 2012, which impose an EU-wide asset freeze and effectively block the company conducting any business within the EU or with EU companies worldwide. The court has now ruled that the Council had not "the slightest evidence capable of supporting" the decision to impose these measures, which have caused a great deal of damage to NITC's business, its employees and its beneficial owners; five million pensioners in Iran.

Rovine Chandrasekera, marine and international trade partner at international law firm Stephenson Harwood, which represented NITC, said: "It is clear that that the Council of the EU had no evidence to support the draconian sanctions imposed on NITC. The damage that has been done to the company, without justification, by the EU Council is significant. We hope the Council will lift the sanctions against NITC as soon as possible."

Author: Katie Hatcher (PR & Communications Manager with Stephenson Harwood) / Publisher: SCMO

 

Sale of contaminated sunflower seed oil – measure of damages

Article published on July 2014 in Stephenson Harwood Shipping Bulletin and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

A FOSFA tribunal considered a claim by Saipol as FOB buyers for contamination of sunflower seed oil. The sale contract was for 3,000 MT sunflower seed oil, which was shipped as part of a total cargo of 16,600 MT. Saipol were buyers of all the cargo from 5 different sellers. Before shipment all 5 consignments had been commingled. On discharge it was discovered that the entire cargo was contaminated.

The buyers claimed the difference in value between sound and contaminated cargo, and also consequential losses. Their claim against Saipol related to all 16,600 MT on the basis that each seller was in breach of contract, and each seller had contributed to the contamination of the whole; accordingly each seller was liable for the whole of the losses. The tribunal held:

1     There being no special circumstances, the applicable measure of damages was that laid down in Sale of Goods Act, s 53(3). Buyers were entitled only to the difference between goods as warranted and their actual value.

2     Sellers' liability extended only to the 3,000 MT.

Buyers appealed.

Held:

The appeal was allowed:
1     The tribunal had proceeded on the basis that the only potentially applicable measures were s 53(3) and s 54. The correct starting point was s 53(2). Under 53(2) there can be, depending upon the facts, a claim for consequential losses on the basis that they will arise in the usual course of things.

2     The tribunal had given no proper reasons for rejecting the contention as to joint contribution in breach of contract relating to the contaminated cargo as a whole.

The matter would be remitted to the tribunal to consider, applying the law as it should have been applied.

(Saipol v Inerco Trade [ 2014 ] EWHC 2211)

Authors: Michael Bundock, Senior Associate and professional support lawyer with Stephenson Harwood & Joanne Champkins, Associate specialising in marine insurance with Stephenson Harwood / Publisher: SCMO

Single European Sky – can the vested interests be overcome

Article published on February 2014 in Legal Eye and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

Following the failure of the first Single European Sky initiative (called SES I, launched in 2004), the European Commission launched a second package of legislation in 2009 called SES II, which was designed to remove the fragmentation caused by the inefficient use of 27 national airspaces, through the introduction of what are called "Functional Airspace Blocks" or FABs. These nine designated FABs were supposed to be operational by the end of 2012, but EU Member States have delayed dismantling their domestic air traffic monopolies in order to form these regional blocks, for political reasons. In early 2012, the EU Transport Commissioner Siim Kallas announced further new legislation proposals which he called "SES II plus", with the objective of accelerating implementation of the SES II reforms, and enabling enforcement measures to be taken against non-compliant EU Member States. Then, in June 2013 the European Commission laid out its proposals to update the four regulations creating the Single European Sky. The key proposals are as follows:

The Commission's June 2013 updated proposals

Better safety and oversight

The Commission is proposing full organisational and budgetary separation of national supervising authorities from the air traffic control organisations they oversee, in order to improve oversight and safety. Many supervisory authorities are currently under-resourced and dependent on the support of the entities they are supposed to oversee. Airlines will also have a new role in signing off air traffic control organisations' investment plans to ensure they are better focused in meeting customer needs.

Better air traffic management performance

The reform of Europe's air traffic management is driven by four key performance targets: safety, cost-efficiency, capacity and environment. Under the current system EU Member States can set their own performance targets and decide which corrective measures to apply if targets are not met. The Commission is proposing to strengthen the performance scheme by making the target-setting more independent, transparent and enforceable, by strengthening their own role in setting more ambitious targets and increasing the independence of the Performance Review Body as the key technical advisor, so as to enable sanctions to be applied when the performance targets are not met by Member States.

New business opportunities in support services

The Commission is proposing to open up business opportunities for more companies to provide support services to air traffic control organisations. Support services such as meteorology, aeronautical information, communication, navigation and surveillance services will have to be separated out under the new draft regulations, so they can be put out to competitive tender in an open and transparent way in accordance with normal EU procurement rules. Support services are the biggest driver of cost in air traffic management and these costs could be cut by 20% if they are put out to competitive tender.

Enabling industry partnerships

None of the nine Functional Airspace Blocks or FABs are fully operational, in spite of a deadline set in December 2012 for EU Member States to establish them. The Commission is currently examining infringement cases against all Member States, particularly where no progress towards reform is made in the next few months. However the Commission has recognised that the FABs are rather inflexible political constructs, so is proposing that service providers co-operate more flexibly by allowing the creation of "industry partnerships" – which will allow service providers to participate in more than one FAB.

Strengthening the role of the Network Manager

The proposed regulations seek to strengthen the role of the Network Manager, Eurocontrol, to ensure that co-ordination of air traffic flows between the national service provider, and tasks such as route design and co-ordination of radio frequencies are carried out more centrally. The proposals could also see the provision of a wider range of services by the Network Manager to air traffic control organisations, such as information networks, monitoring of technical systems, and airspace design. These services could be provided centrally or outsourced by the Network Manager.

The Commission's proposals to update the four regulations creating the Single European Sky will have to be approved by Member States and Parliament before they are passed into law, which could prove to be yet another stumbling block for the progress of these measures.

There has been considerable resistance to some of the measures proposed in the "SES II plus" package from some EU Member States, particularly France and Germany. The European Transport Workers Federation, which represents most of the air traffic controllers and air traffic management workers in Europe has rejected the "SES II plus" package, on the basis that it will only have negative effects on jobs and working conditions for their union members. French air traffic controllers went on strike at the beginning of October in protest at the proposed "SES II plus" package because they are concerned about losing their jobs if the Commission's proposals to deregulate the profession are passed into law. The Air Traffic Controllers European Unions' Co-ordination (ATCEUC) also called for a strike at the beginning of October across 26 European countries – the industrial action was only called off when the European Commission assured them they would take ATCEUC's views into consideration.

Although perhaps not the most exciting package of legislation being debated in Europe at the moment, it is nonetheless critically important for the industry. There are some nine million flights across European airspace annually, and EuroControl is forecasting a further 50% increase in flights over the next 10-20 years. The Commission has estimated that the EU's air traffic management inefficiencies caused by national airspace fragmentation add 42km to the average flight, waste fuel, increase emissions, and cost €4.6 billion per annum. The intransigence of EU Member States, which is rooted in the vested interests of labour protection, the revenue streams generated by national air traffic management bodies, and misplaced concerns over the protection of sovereignty over national airspace, is delaying critical progress in reforming what is a seriously inefficient system. The US controls a similar amount of airspace as Europe, with more traffic, at half the cost, and if and when the "SES II plus" measures are implemented, the European Commission says that safety will be improved by a factor of ten, airspace capacity will be tripled, the cost of air traffic management will be halved, and the impact on the environment of carbon emissions reduced by 10%.

IATA's Director General, Tony Tyler, said earlier this year that progress in the implementation of the "SES II plus" package of measures is critical to the competitiveness of the European aviation industry:

"The European Commission shares the industry's frustration with the failure of European states to progress the SES. Every year that SES languishes in limbo is a €5 billion knock to European competitiveness and costs the environment 8.1 million tonnes of wasted carbon emissions."

Author: Paul Phillips (Partner, Head of aviation litigation and regulation with Stephenson Harwood) / Publisher: SCMO

Airbus - world’s fleet will double in 20 years

Article published on October 2013 in Legal Eye and reproduced by courtesy of Stephenson Harwood

In its latest Global Market Forecast in September, Airbus predicted that in the next 20 years the world will need to double the size of its aircraft fleet from 17,740 aircraft to 36,560 aircraft, as a consequence of economic growth, and increased air travel by the affluent
middle classes in fast growing markets, such as India and China. Of the new 29,220 passenger and freight aircraft predicted by Airbus to be
required, worth over £2.7 trillion, 10,400 will replace existing jets with more fuel-efficient models, with aircraft sizes increasing to make the best use of limited airport capacity.

With air travel becoming increasingly accessible in all parts of the world, the growth of the travelling middle classes, and increased
urbanisation, tourism and migration in emerging economies, Airbus predicts that by 2032 two thirds of the population in emerging markets will take at least one flight annually.

Airbus is also predicting that by 2032 domestic flights within China will be the world’s largest airline market, outgrowing the US domestic market, and that the wider Asia-Pacific region will account for 34% of the total distance travelled by fare-paying passengers.


Author: Paul Phillips (Partner, Head of aviation litigation and regulation with Stephenson Harwood) / Publisher: SCMO